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I. INTRODUCTION 
This research is in response to the changing nature of Marine Corps expeditionary 
operations. Specifically, it seeks to address areas for improvement in C2 and Intelligence 
collection during initial phases of expeditionary operations in austere environments with 
limited logistical footprint. This study seeks to leverage current IT solutions with modern 
communications architecture to provide a demonstrated proof-of-concept for intelligence 
collection in tandem with C2 functions in distributed operations.  
My interest in this field of study stems from my personal experiences as a Marine 
Corps infantry officer. I had the pleasure of deploying twice to Helmand Province, 
Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2010 and 2011–12. 
During both deployments I was struck by how command and control (C2) supportability 
was a major limiting factor that would drive operational planning. Our Marines are 
incredibly bright, talented, and very well equipped to handle any enemy threat. However, 
no modern conventional military unit is capable of operating without maintaining contact 
to a higher headquarters (HHQ) element, which coordinates higher-level functions of 
battlespace management such as air/artillery fire support, logistics, intelligence, and 
casualty evacuation. During both deployments our forces were arrayed in such a way that 
they pushed the limits of current C2 capability. As a Second Lieutenant in 2010, my 
primary communication method to my higher headquarters was the chat function on our 
Blue Force Tracker unit. A civilian satellite system, intended for troop morale usage, was 
the most reliable communication method to my commander, however we could never use 
it to discuss the more sensitive aspects of our operations as it was an unprotected system. 
As I was the officer in charge of a patrol base with 70+ Marines, four MRAP vehicles, a 
forward logistics point, and was simultaneously interfacing with the local police 
headquarters and district political headquarters, this C2 capabilities shortfall was a severe 
hindrance to our complex counter insurgency (COIN) mission. This was largely due to 
the 15+km of mountainous terrain separating my commander and me. Limited 
availability of satellite channels at the tactical level and no reliable relay systems created 
this C2 gap. Later, in 2011, while serving as a company executive officer in charge of 
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running the company combat operations center (COC; company-level C2 node), it came 
to my attention that our squads on the tactical edge using biometrics survey equipment 
had no capability of synchronizing with an accurate database of previously captured 
individuals. As there was no data link between the COC and the dispersed patrol bases, 
these squads would have to return to the main forward operating base (FOB) once a 
month to upload their data to our networked systems. We would then find that they had 
come across persons of interest in the course of their operations but had no way of 
knowing as their local databases were out of date. Additionally, any new intelligence or 
threat reporting had to be conveyed via voice communications or physical delivery of 
intelligence packets to the patrol bases. As we were engaged in a rapidly evolving 
counter-IED (improvised explosive device) and COIN fight, this slowed our ability to 
adapt to our dynamic environment. Contrasted against the computing power and 
information availability in the smartphone in the average American high school student’s 
pocket, we began to question the effectiveness of our C2 capability as a 21st century 
fighting force.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The functional requirements of C2 and intelligence collection in modern 
warfighting have outstripped the linear VHF-based tactical communications architecture 
currently in use by the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), particularly given the 
stresses of over-the-horizon (OTH) expeditionary operations. There is currently a lag 
between the deployment of frontline conventional troops and the establishment of a 
consolidated C2/Intelligence node on the battlefield in expeditionary operations. This 
study seeks a solution to eliminate that lag time and that further enhances the 
commander’s situational awareness and decision-making process during this critical and 
chaotic initial phase of operations. 
B. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this study is to assess the feasibility of a system-of-systems 
approach to C2 and intelligence collection during the initial, austere, and expeditionary 
phases of operations undertaken by the MAGTF in combat and non-combat scenarios. 
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This study will seek to outline the advantages to the commander’s decision-making 
process by allowing for a more distributed deployment of his forces through advanced 
radio technology, more accurate and robust initial intelligence reporting during the initial 
phases of operations, and an IP-based solution to allow reachback to higher headquarters, 
subject-matter experts, and trans-national organizations to deal with contingency 
situations outside the normal scope of operations of the traditional MAGTF. This study 
will provide a detailed performance analysis of current COTS and GOTS systems 
through field experimentation with specific focus on the tactical deployment formations 
of the MAGTF as identified through traditional doctrine and emerging techniques. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This document will seek to answer questions regarding potential solutions to this 
capabilities gap. 
 Compare/contrast benefits of MANET solutions with existing programs of 
record for battlefield networking. 
 How would MANET systems complement the traditional and emerging 
formations of the USMC MEU-Level MAGTF, specifically in the T/O and 
T/E of a CLT? 
 What are the bandwidth capabilities and limitations of a combined 
MANET/SatCom system with only a man-portable equipment footprint? 
 What potential benefits are there for having data connectivity on the 
tactical edge through the use of peripheral devices such as commercial 
smartphones and tablets? 
Hypothesis: Using currently available COTS and GOTS technology, it is possible 
to create a “system of systems” which is able to provide and support a data-rich combat 
networking environment. This environment would provide on-demand services to units 
on the tactical edge while also providing operationally relevant data a higher information-
processing node across significant geographical separation. This C2 architecture would 




D. RESEARCH METHODS 
This research was primarily conducted in a field setting. it included participation 
in multiple field experiments with the Marine Corps Infantry Officer Course as well as 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. In these exercises the potential strengths and 
weaknesses of emerging C2 architectures were considered, use cases for the equipment 
itself evaluated. The observations made were then referenced back to the core planning 
documents of Expeditionary Force 21 (EF21) and the Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 
2025. The research included field-testing of emerging radio technology that could allow 
for high data throughput in ground combat use cases. Finally, a conceptual architecture 
for Marine Corps C2, which incorporates the lessons learned from field experimentation 
and study, was developed.  
E. POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS  
Benefits: This study sought seek to provide a compelling alternative to the 
standard VHF communication framework currently in use by tactical units by 
demonstrating the value added by emerging COTS and GOTS systems through the ability 
to collect and distribute data at the tactical edge. The study also sought to show how the 
data transmission abilities in the current VHF family of tactical communication systems 
are inadequate for the complexities involved in intelligence fusion in the modern 
collection environment.  
Limitations: All data transmissions were only testable with CSFC encryption and 
security. Further testing will need to be done with NSA-approved military level 
encryption protocols. Also, all field-testing with Marine units was dependent on 





F. INITIAL FINDINGS 
Through the literature review process and initial conversations with development 
agencies such as MCWL and IOC, it became readily apparent that these issues are at the 
forefront of the minds of leaders and planners for Marine Corps capabilities 
modernization. Examination of currently available COTS and GOTS systems indicates 
that the technology for the proposed solution sets is already available. The major question 
is then in regards to the best architecture to employ and what requirements drive that 
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II. BACKGROUND  
The Marine Corps of 2025 will fight and win our Nation’s battles with 
multicapable MAGTFs, either from the sea or in sustained operations 
ashore. Our unique role as the Nation’s force in readiness, along with our 
values, enduring ethos, and core competencies, will ensure we remain 
highly responsive to the needs of combatant commanders in an uncertain 
environment and against irregular threats. Our future Corps will be 
increasingly reliant on naval deployment, preventative in approach, 
leaner in equipment, versatile in capabilities, and innovative in mindset. 
In an evolving and complex world, we will excel as the Nation’s 
expeditionary force of choice. 
 – Vision Statement, Marine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025 (USMC, 2007) 
Following the gradual de-escalation of large-scale operations in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the U.S. Marine Corps has 
begun to look to the future of the organization. The past 13 years of war have changed the 
way Marines have come to think about the deployment of conventional forces. The vision 
statement from the 2007 Vision & Strategy document (V&S), seen above, outlines some 
of the key requirements Marines can expect to see in the future. Taken at face value, this 
may seem like a generic re-branding of the Marine Corps Title 10 responsibilities. 
However, through the lens of the Global War on Terror and its follow-on contingency 
operations, this vision has heavier implications.  
Fighting “from the sea” is no longer a reference to the linear, large-scale 
amphibious operations of Tarawa and Iwo Jima in the Second World War. In 2001, the 
15th MEU made history by successfully conducting an amphibious assault at over  
400 miles from the embarking fleet. This was the first conventional ground presence of 
the war, which had, until then, relied on dispersed Special Operations forces (USMC, 
2013). This ushered in a new era of thought in terms of expeditionary maneuver. 
Constraints such as “naval deployment” are no longer as restrictive as they once were. 
With the current aviation support of the modernized amphibious fleet combined with the 
deep-striking potential of the MV-22 Osprey and J-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the 
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Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) has gained an effective range once reserved for 
Carrier Strike Groups. Finally, the “irregular threats” referred to in the 2007 strategy 
document signifies continued requirement for advanced information processing and 
intelligence analysis incurred by counter-insurgency operations, humanitarian crises, and 
other non-traditional military actions. 
A. RECENT PROBLEM SETS 
As OIF has ended and OEF draws to a close, the current deployment patterns and 
formations of Marine Corps ground units do not resemble those of past conflicts. 
Battalions document instances where one platoon commander, typically responsible for 
42 personnel and operating under the control of a company commander, would be 
responsible for over 160 multinational troops with seven static base positions disbursed 
over a wide area of operations (AO) (MCCLL, 2012, p. 8). Other units experienced 
rapidly changing mission sets and shifting AOs that required rapid re-deployment and 
flexible organization. This is often accomplished in coordination with multinational 
forces and with interagency cooperation (3d Battalion, 7th Marines, 2010). In the span of 
a single deployment, a single unit could experience non-kinetic counterinsurgency efforts 
and nation-building, while conducting fully kinetic clearing operations in a different AO 
the next month (3d Battalion, 7th Marines, 2010). 
This trend is not exclusive to units deployed in support of OEF. Regimental 
Combat Teams (RCTs) deployed in support of OIF were eventually responsible for AOs 
such as AO Denver, a 30,000 square mile area in the Western Al Anbar Province of Iraq. 
In addition to the inherent requirements of coordinating combat and security operations, 
these units were responsible for numerous police and military transition teams spread 
throughout the battlespace. Logistically, RCTs were responsible for over $440 Million in 
equipment and $28 Million in engineering and construction contracts. The information 
requirements incurred from this expanded mission set far out-strip what was the 
traditional standard (RCT-2, 2008). 
These advanced mission sets and developing trends in U.S. military deployments 
have led the Marine Corps to seek out a new paradigm for its ability to conduct 
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operations as the “Nation’s expeditionary force of choice”(USMC, 2007). The Marine 
Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) has begun to explore the implications of Distributed 
Operations (DO), which eventually birthed the Enhance MAGTF Operations (EMO) 
concept. In this framework a new vision for the most basic Marine Corps unit was born 
through the concept of Enhanced Company Operations (ECO). This conceptual 
framework examines the capabilities of an infantry company with additional organic 
headquarters support and firepower. ECO allows for the Marine Corps to deploy a lower-
level maneuver unit as an economy of force measure to assert combat power over a larger 
battlespace (MCWL, 2010, pp. 3–6). Before this proposed methodology and its 
implications can be discussed, however, there must be a point of reference in current 
operations.  
B. CURRENT MARINE CORPS TASK ORGANIZATION 
The focus of EMO lies with the principal unit of a MEU: the infantry battalion. 
Figures 1–4 show the current task organization of the infantry battalion and its maneuver 
companies.  
 
Figure 1.  The Marine Corps Infantry Battalion  
(from USMC, 1998, pp. 4–7, 4–8) 
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Figure 2.  The Marine Corps Weapons Company  
(from USMC, 1998, pp. 4–7, 4–8) 
 
Figure 3.  The Marine Corps Rifle Company  
(from USMC, 1998, pp. 4–7, 4–8) 
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The nature of the above organization leaves the individual companies reliant on 
the battalion command structure to provide support in the form of heavy weapons 
allocation, indirect fire agencies, logistics support, and information/intelligence 
processing. The ECO construct under the EMO initiative by MCWL seeks to instead 
transform each individual company into a truly self-sustaining maneuver unit; with all the 
tools it would need to handle an expanded mission set, while deployed away from the 
MEU main body (MCWL, 2010, pp. 3–4). 
While a series of ECO tables of organization have been evaluated, the trend has 
led to the below constructs at the battalion and company levels: 
 
Figure 4.  EMO T/O for MEU (from MCWL, 2009) 
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These company landing teams (CLTs) are the cornerstone of the emerging EMO 
concept. In order to tackle the more diverse mission sets in ECO, the table of 
organization for these units has been modified as follows (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5.  Proposed CLT T/O (after MCWL, 2009) 
The principal changes in this T/O include the addition of a scout section and a 
much more robust headquarters element to include a logistics chief and intel/ops cells. 
Other MCWL experiments have also included additional indirect fires agencies and 
enablers. In the past years there have been live fire tests involving attaching a company 
fires support cell, to include an integrated fire direction center (FDC), to the headquarters 
of a CLT. Other experiments have gone so far as to attach an actual firing artillery battery 
of howitzers or 120mm expeditionary mortar systems directly to the CLT to 
exponentially enhance its combat power. It is also important to note here that the 
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effectiveness of these units was not negatively affected. Rather, the response times 
between contact reports and the complete processing of a fire mission were, on average, 
less than half that of the traditional schema of having the FDC at the battalion 
headquarters level (Finlay, O’Leary, Reid, Sullivan, & Talley, 2011, pp. 5–7). 
C. IT IMPLICATIONS 
The implications of this evolution in expeditionary warfare weigh heavily on the 
capabilities of the communications suite assigned to each CLT. Current experimentation 
involving an enhanced suite of equipment also includes a heavier footprint of equipment 
than is the current standard for an infantry company (MCWL, 2010). This is in direct 
conflict with the aim of the ECO initiative in that it interferes with the requirement of 
high mobility in these units (MCWL, 2012). 
Additionally, the current suite of communications equipment lacks the inherent 
over the horizon (OTH) capability required by these emergent mission sets, while 
maintaining a mobile posture. Current COC gear sets lack the necessary radios to 
maintain a link (SatCom or other) while conducting dismounted movement (MCWL, 
2011, pp. 39–41). As much of the emerging tactical concepts are developed for this new 
EMO model, it is important to remember that these units will typically be deployed from 
aviation assets and will not have the heavy vehicular lift capabilities that have become 
commonplace in OIF and OEF.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As stated earlier, the concept of this project was derived from the development of 
Enhanced MAGTF Operations (EMO) by MCWL. This is an ongoing study into the 
emerging capabilities of the modern Marine Corps in expeditionary, amphibious 
operations. One facet of this is described in the MCWL report on the EM Fires 
experiment in 2011 (Finley, O’Leary, Reid, Sullivan, & Talley, 2011). Here, the concept 
of the Company Landing Team (CLT), as opposed to the Battalion Landing Team (BLT), 
was tested in terms of C2 and fires coordination in conjunction with maneuver. The study 
showed impressive decreases in time required to process fire missions by supporting 
artillery and other agencies (Finley et al., 2011). This provides further support for the 
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evolution of the MAGTF toward more distributed operations. The study did not address 
communications architecture or intelligence collection in any detail, however. 
The conference paper On the Adaptation of Commercial Smartphones to Tactical 
Environments details the utility of using the highly adaptable smartphone family of 
systems in tandem with multiple transmission solutions (Kaul, Makaya, Subir, Shur, & 
Samtani, 2011). Of particular interest was their focus on how smartphones could be used 
to co-opt an existing 3G (or higher) network through VPN-like solutions. They also 
provided rudimentary diagrams on how smartphones could be used in conjunction with 
802.11 Wi-Fi clouds to network various tactical nodes. Data collection in the form of 
reports and images along with geographical location tags could be transmitted along these 
lines (Kaul et al., 2011).  
The utility of ad-hoc wireless mesh networks were demonstrated in the NPS 
Katrina response team’s after action report in 2005. This documents the deployment of 
the NPS HFN Lab’s family of systems to austere conditions with recorded success in 
establishing a workable communications framework for the first-responder community 
(Bradford, Steckler, & Urrea, 2005). Although their success was hindered by lack of 
coordination between USGOV and NGO entities in that event, the actual hardware family 
was a demonstrable success as a rapidly deployable system.  
The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) database contains 
several reports referenced in this thesis from units recently deployed to OEF as well as 
recurring exercises such as Trident Warrior and RIMPAC. These help give background 
data and information on current families of solutions being employed to tackle parts of 
the problem statement in this research. MCCLL is also linked to the experiment reports 
conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL). MCWL has a family of 
experiments that complements this research known as EMO Limited Objective Exercises.  
There have also been several NPS theses in this subject field. Robert Gruber 
completed a detailed study of the propagation of wideband waveforms in shipboard and 
urban environments. He conducted field experimentation aboard large maritime 
prepositioning ships currently at long-term dock in San Francisco. He also conducted 
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urban experimentation aboard Camp Roberts and recorded his findings on radio 
propagation from differing angles, distances, and building materials (Gruber, 2011).  
Joseph Rivera completed thesis work on the implications of MANET systems on 
the larger network management problems the Marine Corps could face. He tackles the 
questions of how to implement MANET solutions into the current architecture and what 
problems and subsequent modifications and tools could be employed in future network 
architectures. His research will be helpful in framing the more robust system this research 
proposes into the existing framework of Marine Corps networks, particularly in deployed 
environments (Rivera, 2012).  
Another study, conducted by two more NPS students around the same time as the 
emerging EMO concept in 2007, details the future need for IP-based radios. It details 
interoperability problems facing the current family of systems with emerging technology. 
Also, it makes the case for 802.11 and 802.16 systems along with mesh networks in 
future operations. Ultimately, this thesis provides further illumination on the emerging 
requirement incurred by distributed operations (Craig & Tsirlis, 2007).  
From a conceptual standpoint, the thesis by Major McHuen and Captain Price 
provides excellent historic perspective on the EMO concept and its implications for 
tactical communications. This thesis uses interoperability models in relation to the then-
developing enhanced company operations (ECO) schema to determine gaps in existing 
technology. It then goes on to recommend future developing systems to address these 
gaps. The interesting concept here is, since it was written in 2009, it was authored at the 
time of transition from the distributed operations model to the current EMO and, 
specifically, the ECO models. Their conclusions are further support for this research in 
that they concluded that a tactical mesh network with voice and data operating at OSI 
layer 3 with IP-based connection to the Global Information Grid (GIG) is the course of 
action the Marine Corps should adopt (Price & McHuen, 2009). My proposed research 
addresses this requirement in light of emerging technologies aimed at fulfilling these 
requirements. 
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Colonel Goulding also supports this conceptual framework in his 2009 Marine 
Corps Gazette article. This is the initial public release documentation of the proposed 
changes to the infantry rifle company, the fundamental unit of the developing company 
landing team and the baseline of EMO. Col Goulding proposes a wholly new table of 
organization for the rifle company to include a distributed scout section and an enhanced 
headquarters element. The headquarters element would contain new units, such as the 
company level intelligence cell and the company level operations cell. Both of these 
subunits would be responsible for command and control, as well as information flow to 
units in the field and to higher headquarters. As such, their data requirements would be 
beyond what is currently standard in the present day operating forces. Even the platoons 
themselves, the functional subunits of the company, would be distributed over larger 
areas of operation than previously anticipated. Col Goulding makes the case that this new 
arrangement would require new ways of thinking about operations as well as new 
technologies to allow for complex operations such as this (Goulding, 2009).  
Captain Puff also has published a thesis regarding the management of ad hoc 
network segments. His conclusions support the development of the system proposed by 
this research while also offering warnings as to avoiding information overload at the 
lower levels of the system. He proposes an 8th layer network management system to 
ensure the right nodes are transmitting the right information in near-real time to increase 
the value to the warfighter. His work specifically applies to the Trellisware radio suite, 
but the case could be made for a more generalizable network management system that 
could work on any family of MANET radios. His study also points out that the 
requirements of tactical operations will continue to have heterogeneous requirements in 
terms of technology required. Specifically, there is no golden fleece in this system 
creation and a combination of multiple technologies with a coherent network 
management system to monitor standards of data transmission is the way ahead  
(Puff, 2011). 
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E. METHODOLOGY  
Over the course of my research I was able to work with both the Infantry 
Officer’s course and Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory as they explored ways of 
tackling these challenges. I was able to physically participate in multiple iterations of 
these experiments and was able to make some observations worth comparing and 








































III. FRAMEWORKS AND ARCHITECTURES 
This chapter explores the potential solution sets for EMO C2 currently proposed 
by the Marine Corps. The two principal organizations explored in the course of this 
research were the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) and the Infantry Officer’s 
Course (IOC), along with their partnership with Marine Corps Systems Command 
(MCSC).  
A. METRICS 
The architectures discussed below were evaluated according to a set of common 
metrics. These metrics are by no means comprehensive, but instead focus on the 
operational viability of the systems proposed.  
 
System Range–Each system must be able to operate at ranges that exceed the 
operational ranges of Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) systems employed by threat 
nations while also able to take advantage of the standoff provided by long range mobility 
assets, specifically, the MV-22 Osprey. 
System Footprint–Each of the architectures was compared in terms of weight, 
packed space, and sustainability. These measures were compared against the 
operationally austere realities specified in Expeditionary Force 21. This addresses the 
architecture’s ability to be sustained without the robust infrastructure enjoyed in the later 
stages of OIF and OEF.  
Technical Capability–This metric is concerned with the data availability within 
the system itself. It was analyzed in terms of RF performance characteristics and data 
throughput.  
Operational Capability–This is a cumulative metric that takes into account the 
previous measures of the system. Capability was analyzed in terms of potential for large 
scale deployment by a Battalion Landing Team (BLT) or greater in a crisis response 
situation or amphibious assault aimed at gaining access to a denied area.  
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Each metric was given a rating in terms of capability it brings to the warfighter. 
The ratings are: 
Operationally Acceptable–The stated system and proposed architecture 
adequately answer the operational imperatives described in Marine Corps planning 
documents. This is a baseline, ready-to-deploy state that could offer basic functionality 
with little additional value added.  
Operationally Unacceptable–The stated system and proposed architecture do not 
adequately answer the problem set stated by Marine Corps planning documents. 
Significant further work is required.  
Emergent Capability–The stated system not only can stand alone as a potential 
answer to the problem set proposed in Marine Corps planning documents, but also 
provides additional capability that could further serve to enable tactical and operational 
maneuver in ways not previously directed by doctrine. The system has the potential to be 
at least a partial game-changer in the way the Marine Corps conducts its operations and 
provides additional vectors toward mission accomplishment.  
B. INFANTRY OFFICER COURSE - TALON REACH 
Beginning in 2013, the IOC staff began to explore the problem sets put forward 
by the Commandant’s Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 document. The director of 
Infantry Officer Course (IOC) recognized that his unit was uniquely positioned to 
conduct proof of concept experimentation due to his highly trained staff and steady 
supply of 60–90 infantry officers cycling through the training every 3.5–4 months. As 
part of the training’s culmination exercise, IOC created a final event that would test the 
equipment and capabilities currently being fielded by the Marine Corps, and specifically 
MCSC. His students would form a provisional CLT and simulate a long-range crisis 
response mission, similar to those predicted by Vision and Strategy and EF21 (IOC, 
2013). As of this document’s writing, this exercise, known as Talon Reach, has gone 
through three iterations. As these exercises were evolutionary in nature, they were 
evaluated as a whole using the metrics above.  
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1. Talon Reach I - March 2013 
This exercise was the first conducted by IOC for the express purpose of testing 
the concepts of EMO against the capabilities of the current C2 equipment set. The 
mission was to simulate a long-range raid taking place over 96-hours. The objective of 
this experiment was to test the CLT’s ability to operate against an enemy that was 
equipped with stand-off A2/AD weapons such as the C-802 and C-803 anti-ship cruise 
missiles (ASCMs). To simulate the long-range requirement, the CLT launched from 
Quantico, Virginia, and travelled via MV-22 to its objective at Camp Blanding, Florida, a 
distance of about 500 miles. The distance was such that the Ospreys had to be refueled 
mid-air en route to and from the objective (IOC, 2013).  
The main objectives of this experiment included validating the ability to conduct 
long-range C2 within an amphibious ship’s operations center and to conduct local C2 as 
the CLT conducted distributed operations against multiple objectives. In order to simulate 
the long range C2, the CLT was required to maintain voice and data communications to a 
simulated headquarters element in Quantico as the CLT conducted operations in Florida. 
To test local C2, the two maneuver platoons operating in Florida were required to attack 
separate objectives while the CLT headquarters element maintained the ability to 
coordinate air support and tactical maneuver through timely and accurate local 
communication. During the initial landing and assault phase of this operation an aerial 
command node, in the form of a UH-1 Huey command variant, coordinated this C2 with 
a mission commander and his team in the back of the UH-1overseeing the operation. This 
capability was only temporary and lasted only through the initial assault phase. Later, all 
voice and data communications had to be facilitated by the infantry units on the ground. 
To further make this experiment more realistic, IOC forced its CLT to operate against an 
opposing force (OPFOR) of about platoon strength. This OPFOR was given significant 
leeway to operate as they saw fit, bearing in mind historical precedents for near-peer 
adversary units. The specific model for operation was the 6–12 man, independently-
operating squads with simple cell phone communication employed by Hezbollah in the 
2006 action against Israel (IOC, 2013).  
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a. Equipment Set 
In order to conduct this operation, the Marines of IOC were augmented with 
additional communications equipment not generally found in the average Marine Corps 
company. In order to facilitate the utilization of this new equipment, IOC placed its 
communications personnel, taken from the infantry-only main body, and put them 
through a 5-day intensive course on the new gear. Additionally, the IOC attached Marine 
Corps communications specialists to the CLT that would normally not be organic to 
ensure they had mitigated the risk of equipment failure due to human error (IOC, 2013). 
With this equipment and training, IOC had created an ideal scenario, which, in and of 
itself, is not completely realistic. However, for the proof of concept experiment, it was 
wholly appropriate. This equipment set included the following entities (see Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6.  Talon Reach I, March 2013 Gear Set (from IOC, 2013) 
PRC‐117F PRC‐152 
PRC‐150 CF‐19 Toughbook 
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The PRC-117 was used as a UHF SatCom radio, which connected to the CF-19 as 
the primary terminal for sending and receiving data. PRC-152s were used as inter-platoon 
radios with PRC-117s using VHF frequencies to talk between distributed platoons. Both 
the PRC-117 and PRC-152 require line of sight (LOS) between radios in order to operate. 
The CLT also used a VideoScout (resembling a modified CF-19) to receive video signals 
from orbiting UAS systems, as well as video feeds from the Lightning Pods on Marine 
attack aircraft.  
b. Architecture 
Due to the reliance on LOS VHF legacy radios such as the PRC-117F and PRC-
152 for communications within the CLT, there was little difference between the 
architecture here and that presented earlier in Chapter II regarding the architecture of 
present-day Marine Corps operations. The major difference is the presence of SatCom 
(albeit intermittent) between the CLT headquarters element and HHQ (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7.  Talon Reach I, March 2013 Communications Architecture 
 24
As shown in the diagram above, the internal communications of the CLT is 
heavily reliant on LOS VHF communications. As such, the platoons in the CLT must 
operate at closer ranges than if they had their own separate long-range asset. This 
architecture offers no significant C2 advancement at the tactical level. 
c. System Performance 
Somewhat predictably, this assortment of equipment proved unreliable and 
impractical. The IOC After Action Review (AAR) bluntly states “all of the [CLT’s] 
communications gear seemed way too heavy, too expensive and arguably, for a concept 
such as the CLT, obsolete” (IOC, 2013). Each piece of gear was developed separately, 
and as such required complicated instructions and somewhat inventive connection 
methods to achieve a baseline operational capability.  
Additionally, the system described above proved to be extremely inflexible and 
tactically cumbersome. The Enhanced Company Operations suite provided by SysCom 
for this experiment (CF-19, digital camera, and associated antennas and radios) weighed 
43 lbs (Deane, 2013). All of that weight was required in order to establish a simple 
SatCom link back to Quantico and enable low-bandwidth data transfer. That is a 
significant investment in weight given that the individual Marines must carry all 
equipment for a mission set—Marines who are attempting to conduct a mission for which 
speed and flexibility are crucial to success. Also, the system incurs a significant amount 
of setup time and requires that the CLT’s C2 node remain static. This becomes a problem 
for a number of reasons. Primarily, this limits the flexibility of the patrol base, which is 
supposed to be able to break down and move on a moment’s notice. Additionally, while 
the patrol base is moving and the system is down, the CLT loses all connectivity to their 
higher headquarters. This presents a potentially dangerous situation where a unit could be 
in transit and come under attack en route. In this case, they would be forced to set up a 
system, which is difficult under the best of conditions, while under fire. To compound 
that, it is likely the headquarters and support units for that CLT would lack current 
awareness about the crisis situation until communications could be established.  
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Another critical shortfall in this system was the information blackout that occurs 
for the unit while in flight. Again, the purpose of this exercise was to simulate the likely 
scenario where a crisis response force is scrambled into the air for a multi-hour long 
flight that may even include aerial refueling. During this flight, the Marines inside the 
cargo bay of the Ospreys have no way of receiving situation updates or real time 
intelligence while in flight unless it is passed through the aircraft’s voice radios, which 
then must be relayed by the pilots to the troop commanders. Despite the additional 
communication gear provided to the CLT in this exercise, they were unable to receive 
updates for the duration of their transit across nearly half the length of the United States’ 
eastern seaboard. Their first update with on-site ISR and the C2 helicopter was when they 
were 10 minutes from the landing zone (LZ) (IOC, 2013). This does not allow for any 
effective in-stride planning or modifications given new and potentially life-saving 
information from reconnaissance forces on the objective or other ISR assets. 
In contrast, despite the OPFOR being outnumbered by a 2:1 ratio, and without the 
maneuverability of MV-22s or drone surveillance assets, they were consistently able to 
conduct more efficient C2 and more flexible maneuver using commercially available 
smartphones and simple GPS-based location applications. Essentially, the most advanced 
C2 equipment IOC was capable of fielding was outpaced by a cell network and hardware 
with a much smaller footprint (IOC, 2013, pp. 3–4). In conversations with the IOC staff, 
it is apparent that this observation has led to a significant feeling of embarrassment and 
frustration in the equipment solution sets currently provided to Marines.  
2. Talon Reach I - December 2013 
As the follow-on exercise for the September iteration of Talon Reach I, and with a 
new wave of students and additional resources, IOC executed a second iteration of Talon 
Reach I to tackle a similar problem set as the original exercise. The December Talon 
Reach I also focused on the Marine Corps’ capability to conduct crisis response at long 
range, however, it altered the scenario to make the execution more complex. Instead of 
being a 96-hour raid, this scenario closely resembles the sort of missions assigned to the 
new Marine Corps Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces (SPMAGTFs) in 
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Europe and Africa following the massacre in Benghazi, Libya in 2012. Specifically, this 
mission was to test a “CLT-like” unit’s ability to conduct a 1000-mile crisis response 
mission in one period of darkness (IOC, 2014).  
The exercise began just before sunset with the CLT launching in MV-22 Ospreys 
from Twentynine Palms, California, to respond to a simulated threat on a U.S. embassy 
and its personnel over 1000 miles away in Ft. Hood, Texas. At 450 miles from the 
objective, the Ospreys were refueled mid-flight. The transit time to the objective lasted 
over four hours. During this time, the assault force was able to utilize their newly 
acquired ANW2 network through the use of the new PRC-117G and communicate via a 
chat application between aircraft. Once at the objective area, which was an urban training 
environment, the assault force was divided up into several distributed units with one 
section securing the notional U.S. Embassy and another fast-roping onto the roof of the 
notional ambassador’s house. Later, another force was sent to deal with an enemy force 
outside of the immediate urban center. Once all U.S. assets were secure, the CLT 
consolidated their forces and extracted via the same Ospreys on which they had arrived 
for the transit back to Twentynine Palms, all before the sunrise (IOC, 2014).  
The exercise was a success in that it proved that Marines are capable of 
conducting long-range crisis response in a manner that could respond to future Benghazi-
like situations. This was largely due to the addition of new C2 equipment. 
a. Equipment Set 
The major difference in terms of equipment for this exercise compared to the 
September iteration was IOC eschewing the bulky CF-19 Toughbooks, PRC-117Fs, and 
PRC-150s in favor of the smaller, more capable PRC-117G, the newly fielded  
Distributed Tactical Communications System (DTCS) radios, and Android tablets, as 
shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.  Talon Reach I Gear Set, December 2013 (from IOC, 2014) 
The DTCS radio is essentially a satellite-based push-to-talk (PTT) radio. It 
operates by using the commercial Iridium satellite constellation. In conversation with 
Marines using the device, it is favored because when it is set up properly, it requires 
almost no training to employ. To the average user it is simply another “walkie talkie” 
style radio that simply works when VHF communications fail. In the IOC exercise, these 
devices became the primary voice C2 method to the HHQ element in Miramar, 
California, as well as the primary voice C2 internal to the CLT as it moved between its 
multiple objectives. Further, as the CLT units became more distributed, they faced the 
problem of losing voice communications with each of the sub-units as they maneuvered 
due to the legacy VHF, LoS communications equipment’s (PRC-152s) inability to 
provide the range or flexibility required by the mission. DTCS became the primary C2 
net throughout the unit, and at one point it was the only way in which the command 
element was able to continue to process fire support missions by using the position 
location information (PLI) that is simultaneously broadcast during voice transmissions 
between DTCS radios (IOC, 2014).  
DTCS Radio PRC‐117G Marine with Samsung Tablet 
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Additionally, the PRC-117G’s addition allowed the CLT to utilize the ANW2 
data network. The technical aspects of this network are discussed later, but the major 
takeaway in this exercise was the highly acclaimed added capability of conducting text 
chat and limited data transfer between units while airborne. This begins to address the 
lack of situational awareness while in transit as discussed in the previous exercise as 
updates from the air crew could be pushed across the text chat network between separate 
elements of the assault force. The PRC-117G can also be used in simple VHF/UHF voice 
communications like legacy equipment as well as interface with UHF satellite 
communications using static, deployable antennas.  
The Samsung Android OS tablets proved to be the greatest paradigm shifting 
equipment item in this experiment. Using these systems, in conjunction with some simple 
mapping and imagery and chat applications, Marines in the exercise assault force were 
able to greatly increase the situational awareness of the Marine leadership during this 
exercise. These tablets connected via an 802.11 Wi-Fi device attached to the PRC-117G, 
allowing the tablets to communicate on the ANW2 data network. This device uses Suite 
B encryption over its Wi-Fi link, requiring the PRC-117G to re-encrypt traffic to military 
standards prior to broadcast to another PRC-117G node. With the PRC-117Gs 
multicasting the ANW2 signal, each tablet was able to see information being shared 
between each PRC-117G. This, with the addition of simple applications, created a 
rudimentary collaborative information environment with shared data and awareness. 
b. Architecture 
Both the ANW2 network and the DTCS network were combined with the legacy 
NET-T network used in satellite communications between the MV-22s and their 
headquarters element. The PRC-117G radios are able to multicast their ANW2 signal so 
that each radio on that network will share the same situational awareness data. This is 
how the collaborative information environment was possible while the unit was in the air 
as it used multiple chat rooms to provide updates and refine planning (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9.  Talon Reach I, December 2013 
In the absence of a C2 Osprey, which could relay the ANW2 signals, the DTCS 
network served as the backbone of internal voice communications, as well as long-range 
communications to HHQ.  
c. System Performance 
This new architecture begins to answer some of the problems put forward by the 
initial iterations of the Talon Reach exercise series and addresses necessary capabilities 
implied by EF21. The addition of peripheral devices at the tactical edge greatly increased 
the situational awareness of Marine leaders en route to their objective. Since each aircraft 
had at least one Marine leader with a tablet connected to the ANW2 data network, the old 
tradition of the assault force being “in the dark until the ramp drops” is beginning to fade 
away. It should be noted, however, that the limited bandwidth of the ANW2 waveform 
tends to be the main limiting factor. Technicians from MCWL claim that it stays around 
40 kbps in terms of data transfer. This limits the CLT’s ability to fully integrate assets 
like full motion video (FMV) from ISR assets tasked against the objective, particularly 
while en route.  
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Additionally, while the addition of the PRC-117G was a great boost to the assault 
force, its limited numbers often left maneuver units reliant on their legacy VHF radios. 
This resulted in a potentially unsafe and tactically unsound situation when an enemy air 
defense threat was revealed during the course of the mission. Given the assault force’s 
reliance on their air assets and operating so far from friendly lines, this asset received the 
highest priority for kinetic targeting. However, the Joint Terminal Air Controller (JTAC) 
assigned to the CLT headquarters element was unable to rapidly gain the necessary 
situational awareness in terms of friendly positions so that he could employ fire support 
safely and without the possibility of fratricide. This was due to lack of performance on 
the part of the legacy VHF communications that were the primary method of internal 
communication within the CLT. The CLT was able to rapidly flex its plan and instead 
used its DTCS radios and their associated PLI information to safely clear fire support 
(IOC, 2014). This demonstrates, however, the necessity for a local network that can 
support a data-rich environment and simultaneously update PLI, situational awareness, 
transmit coordinating instructions, and also retain simple voice communications. The 
fluid environment of crisis response requires that this network be fully functioning before 
the ramp of the Osprey ever touches down and must be robust enough to react to a 
rapidly changing battlefield.  
3. Talon Reach II- March 2014 
Leveraging the lessons learned from the previous exercise under Talon Reach I, 
IOC sought to further refine their employment of the ANW2 network with its associated 
PRC-117Gs and Android Tablets to create a more robust data network in a long range 
raid on a simulated enemy A2/AD asset, specifically a C-802 ASCM site located on San 
Clemente Island, California. To simulate launching from amphibious shipping, the 
mission was launched from Twentynine Palms, California, which essentially puts it as the 
mirror image of the ship locations represented in Figure 10. The primary objectives of 
this exercise were to further test the system’s ability to maintain C2 while en route to the 
objective, to facilitate coordination of fire support assets before, during, and after 
debarkation of the assault force, and to test the system’s ability to maintain connectivity 
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to the aerial assets and their associated C2 nodes on station during the assault once 
debarkation was complete.  
 
Figure 10.  Representation of C-802 Threat on San Clemente Island  
(from IOC, 2014) 
Unique to this experiment was the employment of what is doctrinally referred to 
as a Fire Support Team [Airborne] (FST(A)). The FST(A) is a small cell of fire support 
subject matter experts combined with an infantry officer that provide the necessary 
coordination between artillery, naval gunfire assets, and close air support sorties while 
ensuring their usage is closely tied to the assault force mission commander’s scheme of 
maneuver. This team remains airborne during the chaotic initial assault, often employing 
their fire support assets before the first transport aircraft disembarks the first wave of 
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Marines. For this exercise, the FST(A) was placed in a specially modified MV-22 Osprey 
that was configured to be a C2 variant. This Osprey housed two PRC-117G radios in the 
crew compartment and had additional cabling to provide easier access for the passengers 
to the aircraft’s organic radio networks (IOC, 2014).  
As for maneuver, the two platoons were disembarked at separate objectives  
about 3 km apart from each other and without line of sight between them, as shown in 
Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.  Talon Reach LZ Locations (from IOC, 2014) 
Once the two platoons secured their individual objectives, they conducted link-up 
on higher ground, reorganized themselves, and began a 23 km (~14 mile) nighttime foot 
movement to their final objective, which in this exercise was an enemy airfield. In order 
to facilitate faster movement, the CLT employed hand-launched UAS in the form of the 
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Wasp UAV platform. This was used to scout ahead and allowed the CLT commander 
greater confidence in recognizing potential threats before his unit encountered them.  
As in Talon Reach I, this operation took place during a single period of darkness. 
The initial assault took place at sunset, with the movement-to-contact the airfield taking 
the entire night. This again demonstrated the necessity for a network that provides key 
functionality prior to the first Marines debarking the transport aircraft. 
a. Equipment 
This exercise used largely the same equipment set as was used in the Ft Hood 
exercise in December 2013. They had, however, increased the number of PRC-117Gs 
and used the Wasp UAV. The CLT again used Samsung tablets with the Killswitch 
application and a simple chat window called CowChat (IOC, 2014). These applications 
also utilized the ANW2 network formed by the PRC-117Gs. The Wasp was unable to 
interface with this ANW2 network due to software compatibility issues, limiting the 
benefit to situational awareness to only those directly viewing the video feed from its 
associated laptop and control base station.  
b. Architecture 
The architecture of this network was very similar to that of the December iteration 
of Talon Reach I. Again, DTCS played a vital role in beyond line-of-sight 
communications. Its associated PLI information was also collected at the HHQ facility in 
Miramar, CA. Additionally, the FST(A) was able to use the aviation radios to conduct an 
aerial relay of information to HHQ during the initial assault. The major change was the 
more robust usage of the ANW2 network while in flight, as well as the inclusion of the 
FST(A) (see Figure 12). This FST(A) was able to receive targeting information via the 
Killswitch application on their tablets through the ANW2 network from the assault force.  
They could then use their internal radios to coordinate with outside assets, such as the 
gunship support and the advanced J-35 radar systems being tested in parallel with this 
exercise. Once the initial assault was complete, the FST(A) was disembarked and 
rejoined the CLT main body. At that point they were reliant on DTCS for long-range 
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communication to HHQ while they retained their ability to use the tablets on the ANW2 
network for targeting. 
 
Figure 12.  Talon Reach II Architecture 
c. System Performance 
A common thread of architecture and techniques, as well as equipment 
employment, emerges throughout the IOC Talon Reach experimentation campaign. In 
particular, the PRC-117G and its Wi-Fi transmitter, the Fortress system, and the 
associated tablets with their applications provided an impressive improvement in C2 
capability at a small unit level. The 5–20 Watt power output of the portable PRC-117G 
allowed it to transmit over impressive distances when compared to legacy radio systems 
(Harris, 2014). The tablets and their applications greatly increased situational awareness 
both on the ground and in the air while in transit. However, the baseline capability of the 
ANW2 network was a limiting factor with respect to supported data richness. The 
bandwidth of the network during this exercise was limited at 5Mhz due to base 
restrictions. This resulted in the previously mentioned low throughput of 40kbps (max). 
This low data capability was successful in transmitting basic information, such as text 
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chat and PLI. However, this low rate precluded large file transfers such as high-resolution 
photography and FMV. It should be noted as well that all imagery and map files had to be 
pre-loaded on each tablet. The low data rates precluded retrieving map data from an off-
site server. Also, due to equipment compatibility and availability, not all of the C2 nodes 
on the network were able to take full advantage of the system. That is to say, there was no 
C2 software that combined the PLI data from DTCS with the internal GPS of the tablets 
and PRC-117G radio nodes, nor the coordinating data being transmitted across the local 
ANW2 network in the field. This resulted in a lack of true end-to-end connectivity. 
However, in fairness to IOC, the inclusion of larger HHQ assets and more equipment 
would require a larger staff and more resources than are immediately available to that 
small unit. Again, the focus of this campaign of experimentation was to serve as a proof 
of concept and to provide realistic field-testing of unproven systems and concepts while 
also recording emergent techniques and procedures for expeditionary C2. For a larger 
scale test bed that could equate to the scale of a Battalion Landing Team (BLT) or higher-
level unit, we must turn to the campaign of experimentation by the MCWL. 
C. MCWL ECO AND EMO TEST BEDS 
In response to the Commandant’s planning guidance, the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Lab (MCWL) has undergone a series of experiments to test current 
capabilities and develop new techniques and technology in order to enable EMO. Their 
campaign of experimentation was born out of the previous campaign, which explored 
distributed operations, specifically, enabling this type of operation in areas such as 
Afghanistan’s Helmand province, drawing from lessons learned in the Iraq war.  
There are a few major differences between their experiments and those conducted 
by IOC. First, there is the matter of scale. IOC was focused on the CLT by itself; IOC 
was only concerned with proving functionality inside a low level unit. MCWL, however, 
has applied the same concepts on the scale of a battalion (reinforced) landing team 
(MCWL, 2009). Secondly, there is a fundamental difference in mentality as far as 
equipment footprint is concerned. The IOC experiments were solely focused on 
equipment that could be transported on the backs of Marines as part of an assault force. 
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MCWL explores options including internally transportable vehicles and externally 
hoisted heavy artillery pieces. These additions provide both enhanced functionality as 
well as additional requirements for C2 capabilities. Thirdly, there is a difference in the  
C2 equipment set being used. MCWL is exploring Ku- and Ka-band SatCom links as 
well as introducing MANET systems at the tactical edge, whereas IOC is focused on 
implementing more thoroughly vetted programs of record such as its PRC-117G.  
Like the IOC campaign of experimentation, the MCWL campaign has been 
incremental in nature. It began under the title of Enhanced Company Operations (ECO) 
Limited Objective Experiments (LOEs) and has since evolved into Enhanced MAGTF 
Operations (EMO) LOEs. 
1. ECO LOE 4 
The ECO LOEs were focused on exploring technologies and techniques which 
would allow multiple CLTs to operate in a disbursed environment where each CLT was 
not necessarily directly mutually supporting, that is, not directly capable of offering fire 
support to their adjacent units and vice versa (MCWL, 2010, pp. 7–8). The objectives of 
this experiment included testing a new equipment set that would enhance the CLTs 
ability to coordinate between each other as well as an off-shore HHQ element. Another 
objective was to test the current architectures and techniques while adding the additional 
requirements of fire support coordination and control and logistical sustainment.  
This experiment took place on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. There were two main 
objective areas, per the graphic in Figure 13. Golf Company, 2nd Battalion, 3d Marines 
(G/2/3) was selected as the experimental unit. Its three platoons were embarked in such a 
manner that the ranges between them locally and over the horizon to HHQ were beyond 
the capacity of current communications equipment (MCWL, 2010, pp. 21–28). 
Additionally, G/3 (third platoon) was given an attached artillery battery to provide local 
fire support for the CLT. This artillery integration at such a low unit level is not a 
doctrinal template for the Marines, and is a result of the Expeditionary MAGTF Fires 
(EM Fires) experiment conducted by 3d Battalion, 7th Marines in 2010, which will be 
discussed later (3d Battalion 7th Marines, 2010).  
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Figure 13.  Force Layout for ECO LOE 4 Experimentation Unit  
(from MCWL, 2010) 
As seen in Figures 13 and 14, the force was divided up so that the force at KTA 
would provide organic fire support in the form of artillery to the other units maneuvering 
around the island. This artillery addition required the inclusion of its associated C2 node, 
the Fire Direction Center (FDC). This posed additional strain on the C2 architecture 
being used on the island. Once all forces were ashore, the experimental control division 




Figure 14.  Force Layout in ECO LOE 4, KTA and MCTAB are Objective 
Locations (from MCWL, 2010) 
a. Equipment 
This experiment contained several different pieces of equipment from the suite 
used by IOC. The principal exception here was the widespread use of the DTCS radio 
(MCWL, 2010, p. 8). These DTCS radios were configured in such a way that had a more 
limited range than the versions later employed by IOC, with a maximum range of around 
150 miles (MCWL, 2010, p. 8). However, they ended up forming the backbone of the 
distributed communications network.  
MCWL also introduced a MANET for local networking in this experiment. In 
order to form this network, they employed the TrellisWare family of radios. Specifically, 
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they employed the TW-200. This radio was able to create a simultaneous voice and data 
network for use at the tactical edge of this operation (MCWL, 2010, p. 8).  
Lastly, the major addition to this network was the introduction of the Mobile 
Expeditionary Tactical Network-CLOC Enabler (METN-CE). The METN-CE is a 
modified HMMWV (Figure 15). The vehicle contains all the communications equipment 
necessary to maintain the different networks in use by the unit, as well as a small laptop-
based server and data management system for reachback to HHQ offshore. It uses a Ku-
band SatCom data trunk for file transfer and is able to simultaneously monitor multiple 
DTCS networks (MCWL, 2010, p. 35).  
 
Figure 15.  METN-CE  
It should be noted, however, that despite this experiment taking place in 2010, 
with a well-established commercial mobile device market, no smartphones or tablets 
were employed in conjunction with the experimental network. Rather, the CLT was 
forced to work on laptops, either aboard the METN-CE or with smaller, ruggedized 
laptops at the platoon-level (MCWL, 2010, p. 36). While not explicitly mentioned in the 
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report, the results of working with laptops at the tactical edge would almost certainly 
mirror IOC’s experience in their original Talon Reach experiment in Florida.  
b. Architecture 
The operational layout of this exercise has some striking similarities to that used 
by the IOC team. Both templates call for a long range landing beyond the horizon from 
an offshore HHQ unit. Both templates also call for the internal units of the CLT to 
operate in a distributed manner, putting their units beyond line of sight. However, the 
communications architecture of the two experiments is fundamentally different. In the 
IOC experiment, the focus was on long-range Osprey raids. A key component of 
heliborne operations is the concept of redundancy. Aircraft can be lost prior to or during a 
landing due to equipment failure or hostile fire. Each component of the landing force 
must be able to achieve some level of basic functionality, independent of other landing 
units. For this reason, the IOC architecture ensured that each platoon in the CLT had 
virtually identical communications suites. However, in ECO LOE 4, MCWL opted to 
adopt an architecture that relies more on one central C2 node, the METN-CE. They 
adopted this architecture because of their stated requirements to transfer larger data files 
to and from the field unit, such as map overlays and imagery (MCWL, 2010, p. 35). 
MCWL cites the low data throughput rate of the DTCS (2.4 kbps) as the driving factor in 
adopting a Ku-band SatCom link. Current technology in use by MCWL requires this Ku 
system to be supported by a vehicle due to its increased data footprint.  
Another principal difference in the C2 architecture is the introduction of a true 
MANET into the network. In the IOC experiments, only a few PRC-117Gs were fielded 
which could provide a distributed data network. With the introduction of the TrellisWare 
radios, this architecture evolves from a rudimentary network based on Routing 
Information Protocol (RIP) to a dynamic, self-healing, and algorithmically routed data 
environment with the added capability of providing PLI to network managers and 
enhancing situational awareness of friendly forces (MCWL, 2010, p. 34). For a diagram 
of this architecture, refer back to Figure 13.  
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c. System Performance 
Like the IOC experiments, the MCWL 2010 LOE 4 proves that the types of 
operations listed in documents such as EF21 are technically feasible through a 
modernization of MAGTF C2 assets (MCWL, 2010, p. 10). The analysis report for this 
experiment largely lists its success as being due to the performance of the DTCS 
network. Heavy traffic congestion is cited as being the principal problem with this DTCS 
network; however, the observers conclude that this is more a result of a lack of adequate 
training on the new system rather than the fault of the hardware itself (MCWL, 2010,  
p. 10).  
The inclusion of the TrellisWare radio systems seems to have drawn considerable 
excitement from the individual Marines in this experiment. Basic functionalities, such as 
range and voice quality, were a marked improvement over legacy equipment, which at 
the time were PRC-152s and PRC-117Fs. However, the analysis notes that the 
TrellisWare system is “more than just a radio,” despite its use as solely a voice 
communications asset (MCWL, 2010, p. 11). All data at the tactical edge, with the 
platoons and squads not co-located with the METN-CE, was forced to go through the 
DTCS system. This, combined with the noted lack of additional peripheral devices, left 
the Marines with no way with which to take full advantage of the significantly higher 
throughput of the TrellisWare radios, if only to use them to create a LAN.  
The operational feasibility draws some concern as well. As stated, this 
architecture relies heavily on the vehicle-based METN-CE for network management and 
the sustainment of the data trunk. MCWL notes that the METN-CE would have lost its 
Ku-band link had it gone mobile during this operation (MCWL, 2010, p. 35). Combined 
with the platoons’ requirement to have an open laptop to sustain a data link rendered the 
CLT largely immobile. This is the major drawback between this experiment and those 
conducted by the IOC team. The IOC equipment suite was tailored to a rapidly moving 
force, able to respond to changing situations with much greater flexibility. While the 
MCWL architecture added significant long-range data capability in the form of its Ku-
band link, the expense was flexibility. If the METN-CE was required to go mobile, then 
the whole unit would be reliant on the DTCS network.  
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2. MCWL RIMPAC 2014 Full System Test  
As stated earlier, the 2010 ECO experimentation campaign was the culmination of 
the ECO program. That program would then give rise to the EMO program, which 
culminated with the 2014 LOE as part of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2014 exercise. 
As this exercise was taking place at the time of this writing, its performance data was not 
currently available. However, I was able to observe the full systems test (FST) aboard 
Marine Corps Base Quantico prior to the equipment’s deployment to Hawaii to 
participate in RIMPAC 2014.   
As with LOE 4, this experiment largely focused on the Marines’ capability to land 
and operate in a distributed manner while testing and evaluating the CLT concept as a 
whole. However, the EMO experiment was designed on a larger scale; instead of one 
CLT operating in a distributed manner, the MAGTF would deploy three CLTs comprised 
of Marines integrated with multinational forces. A single Marine company formed the 
backbone and C2 structure of the landing force, with each CLT containing one or two 
U.S. Marine platoons, partnered with two platoons from Canadian, Malaysian, Tongan, 
Australian, Indonesia, and New Zealand units (MCWL, 2014).  
Each of these CLTs was expected to operate independently of others in its 
respective objective area. Unlike the previous ECO experiment, the direct augmentation 
with a full artillery battery was not anticipated. However, each CLT would be required to 
operate multiple Raven UAVs, manage a robust Combat Operations Center (COC), and 
coordinate airspace and fires deconfliction, as well as the enduring tasks of logistics and 
security. These tasks were expected to be considerably more difficult given the 
distributed nature of the operation, the multinational nature of the force, and the limited 
accessibility of the training areas in Hawaii where the experiment was to take place 
(MCWL, 2014). The CLT units would then be opposed by an OPFOR to stress-test the 
C2 architecture and the systems themselves. 
a. Equipment 
For this experiment, MCWL made a complete departure from existing C2 
programs of record. The experimental force was not provided any legacy PRC-117, PRC-
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152, or PRC-150 radio sets, as had previously been used by MCWL and IOC. Instead, the 
experiment relied heavily on software-defined equipment and IP-protocol driven 
communications methodologies (MCWL, 2014). The primary network for this 
experiment was implemented with the TrellisWare family of radios. This was augmented 
by newer, improved DTCS radios, as before. The major addition to this architecture, 
which seems to partially mimic that of LOE 4, is the added application layer, the 
Integrated Capabilities Application, in the data network and the inclusion of a new C2 
node, the Marine Expeditionary – Light (ME-L), as shown in Figure 16.  
 
Figure 16.  ME-L; Front Tray Extended 
The ME-L, is a compact Jeep-like vehicle that can be internally transported within 
a MV-22 Osprey. This vehicle is designed as an integrated communications node. Both 
DTCS and TrellisWare radios are integrated into its onboard systems, which allow the 
users to monitor multiple networks at once. Additionally, there is an onboard server that 
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manages the software application suites in use by the CLT as well as acting as a data and 
network management system (Figure 17). For this experiment, the CLTs were given an 
application suite known as the Integrated Capabilities Application (ICA), which comes in 
a laptop-based form as well as a mobile form for tablet users at the tactical edge. This 
ICA software serves to provide a common operational picture for units on the network, 
sharing information between units and providing information regarding the battlespace to 
the end user as well as HHQ. Additionally, units were also provided the Advanced Field 
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) software running on a ToughBook for their 
indirect fires control units. The TrellisWare radios serve to provide the physical and data 
link layers for these applications. These networks are then controlled by the ME-L, which 
controls the primary data connection to the offshore HHQ and logistics units.  
 
Figure 17.  ME-L Internal Servers and Network Management 
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Each ME-L uses a Ku SatCom dish to provide long-range backhaul and its 
onboard server controls this data flow. DTCS systems are also integrated but are largely 
considered a secondary connection for use in on-the-move scenarios since the Ku link 
cannot be sustained while the ME-L is mobile. Lastly, the airborne layer of this system 
was provided by the TrellisWare radios. They were simply programmed to operate on 
single UHF, single-hop channels much like legacy equipment (MCWL, 2014).   
b. Architecture 
Conceptually, the addition of the ME-L simplifies the C2 architecture for this 
experiment. Each CLT operates its own TrellisWare subnet, with the channel distribution 
behaving much the same way it would in legacy systems. Companies would have two 
command networks with each platoon having its own internal network. Being that these 
self-forming networks are provided by intelligent MANET radios, each network creates 
its own area of connectivity for peripheral devices to support the ICA suites. 
Concurrently, the DTCS network acts as a secondary voice communication method in 
long-range distributed operations situations or when the ME-L backhaul is down. Each 
unit is able to communicate with aviation assets since they have a channel on the 
TrellisWare that allows for simple UHF communication. This results in a relatively 
straightforward architecture in the physical domain of the network, as seen in Figure 18.  
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Figure 18.  MCWL FST Architecture 
However, the architecture becomes more complicated when viewed in the logical 
space. Each TrellisWare network must be configured with consideration for the 
distribution of nodes in the IP address space. This requires substantial setup and pre-
programming on the part of communications specialists. The relatively low throughput of 
the Ku-Band SatCom system aboard the ME-L, in addition to the application layer 
requirements of the ICA, requires the ME-L to act as the control node for all traffic on the 
local network. It must both manage what is backhauled to the HHQ units as well as what 
data is available and shared among the subordinate TrellisWare data networks. 
When multiplied by the scale of three CLTs and the additional logistical and 
operational control nodes present at the HHQ level and all associated application layer 
role names and connections, the architecture becomes much more complicated. As this 
IP-centric architecture is new to the Marine Corps, there are not standard ways of 
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assigning role names and IP space on a MAGTF scale with multiple landing teams. 
Policy and procedures are necessary to minimize confusion and mitigate human error. 
c. System Performance 
All observations regarding this potential solution set were taken at the time of the 
FST in March 2014. Further data is expected to become available following the 
completion of the RIMPAC 2014 exercise. However, there are a few items of note to be 
taken from the FST.  
First, the data rates between the individual Trellisware radios far exceeds that of 
the ANW2 network and its associated PRC-117Gs in use by the IOC campaign of 




Figure 19.  TrellisWare Data Rates for March 2014 MCWL FST  
(from MCWL, 2014) 
It is these higher data rates that enable a much more robust, data-rich operational 
C2 environment. This allows applications (i.e., AFATDS and ICA) to share a single data 
network and remain effective. However, the speed of the local MANET will continue to 
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be limited by the throughput of the Ku SatCom asset on the ME-L for data passed 
between HHQ and edge units. In the FST, this Ku system was able to handle 2 Mbps for 
throughput. This puts additional requirements on the local servers aboard the ME-L to 
prioritize data transmission and apportion the long-range backhaul between the 
applications on the network as well as voice channels.  
Secondly, there have been some concerns with the ME-L itself. In conversation 
with Marines and engineers aboard MCWL, doubts were expressed about the vehicle’s 
reliability as well as its general capabilities as an off-road vehicle. Anecdotal accounts 
cite the vehicle as having poor maneuverability and limited capacity in unimproved road 
environments, in addition to reliability issues. While this is understandable in a prototype, 
it does raise concerns as to the viability of a Jeep-like vehicle in extreme austere 
environments, such as unimproved mountainous terrain and jungles. The ME-L, in its 
current configuration, is the single point of failure for this architecture. This poses 
logistical as well as operational risk on the unit. Its maneuverability and survivability will 
limit the maneuverability of these small units if it is not redesigned to tackle the 
challenges of difficult infantry deployments, as taken from historical context.  
D. FINAL SYSTEM EVALUATIONS 
Each system, when compared using the metrics discussed earlier in this chapter, 
highlights its own advantages and disadvantages. Presented below is a short summary of 
my evaluation of each system with a short amplification as to the scoring. The reader 
should bear in mind that the standards for these evaluations are taken from the 
implications of the EF21 document and the emerging missions and areas of operation for 
the Marine Corps of the future.  
1. Talon Reach 
The Talon Reach campaign of experimentation combined the capabilities of the 
currently fielded Marine Corps’ equipment set with some modest additions in order to 
achieve results in real-world scenarios. These scenarios are taken strait from the EF21 
document in that they require the landing force to conduct network centric C2 in the 
austere littorals (real and simulated) in order to achieve objective success in a denied area 
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(USMC, 2014, pp. 6–9). While the CLT was able to achieve a measure of success, there 
were some artificialities built into the training evolution, largely due to support or 
equipment limitations. Namely, while the PRC-117G performed admirably when 
compared to its current generation peer radios, it alone is incapable of achieving the 
prescribed 65 nm range as per EF21. The system is capable of being retransmitted, 
however, this would require persistent aerial relay, or multiple terrestrial retransmission 
sites, rapidly increasing the support requirement for this system. The addition of the 
DTCS system may seem like an apparent solution, however, the DTCS data rates are 
inadequate to support a truly net-centric unit, as described by EF21. This lack of over-
the-horizon data rich connectivity in support of user-oriented applications leaves this 
system largely lacking in the category of technical capability. This solution set’s major 
benefit, however, is its footprint. All systems in this suite of hardware could be carried by 
a lightweight, maneuverable assault force without the need for fixed sites or heavier 
ground vehicle support. This family of systems is a rough analog of current-generation 
systems and requires little form factor changes for the end users. Overall, while this is a 
positive step for Marine Corps C2, it is still inadequate to the requirements of 
expeditionary net-centric C2 requirements (Table 1).  
Table 1.   Talon Reach Rating 
 Unacceptable Acceptable Emergent 
System Range 
 
   
System Footprint 
 
   
Technical 
Capability 
   
Operational 
Capability 
   
 
2. MCWL LOE 4 
The added resources of MCWL led to them being able to produce a more robust 
system, unconstrained by existing programs within the Marine Corps Table 2). The 
addition of the MANET in the form of TrelliWare radios provided a significant 
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terrestrial-based communications improvement, with each radio conducting intelligent 
OSI layer-2 forwarding and updating link statuses. The DTCS radios were again used to 
provide longer-range communications, and even limited text chat functionality with PLI 
inputs. However, the data rates available to the network through the employment of the 
higher-throughput TrellisWare radios were not employed. Instead, the network was 
treated like an intelligent voice-centric radio network. All major data backhaul was 
conducted with the use of the Ku-band satellite antenna mounted on their METN-CE 
vehicle. Individual data terminals came in the form of full laptop computers, vice smaller 
mobile devices. This greatly increased the footprint of the system and countermands the 
EF21 requirement for the CLT to be a lightweight and maneuverable force, capable of 
communications on-the-move (USMC, 2014, pp. 8, 35–36).  
Table 2.   MCWL LOE 4 Rating 
 Unacceptable Acceptable Emergent 
System Range 
 
   
System Footprint 
 
   
Technical 
Capability 
   
Operational 
Capability 
   
 
3. MCWL RIMPAC 2014 FST 
The MCWL RIMPAC 2014 FST constitutes a massive leap forward in Marine 
Corps expeditionary C2. By taking full advantages of the TrellisWare MANET, tactical 
units are afforded a simultaneous voice and data network with a throughput rate that far 
exceeds the ANW2 systems currently in use. While company command posts were still 
afforded the computing power of laptops, the individual tactical units are provided with 
lighter tablets while still affording them enhanced battlefield situational awareness and 
greater accessibility to data than was previously possible. These peripheral devices feed 
into the larger battlefield network and provide the necessary inputs, in conjunction with 
PLI from the TrellisWare and DTCS radios themselves, for a comprehensive COP for 
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decision makers. Effective system range is enabled by the MANET locally as well as the 
links made available to the end user by bridging the MANET with the Ku SatCom link. 
However, the system’s footprint still raises questions (Table 3). The viability of the 
current version of the ME-L and the operational implications of a single point of failure 
raise significant concerns.  
Table 3.   MCWL RIMPAC 2014 FST Rating 
 Unacceptable Acceptable Emergent 
System Range 
 
   
System Footprint 
 
   
Technical 
Capability 
   
Operational 
Capability 
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IV. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE 
Building on the advances of the MCWL and IOC campaigns of experimentation, 
this chapter seeks to propose another methodology and potential framework for achieving 
the objectives of expeditionary C2 for the Marine Corps. This chapter will focus on three 
key areas. First, it will address the implications for advances in MANET technology and 
its field-tested results. Additionally, it will explore the implications of moving Marine 
communications to an “all IP” solution. Secondly, this chapter will explore the potential 
equipment suites, which may address the problem of limiting the system’s footprint to 
what is physically transportable by individual Marines. Lastly, this chapter will seek to 
address an IP architecture, which would provide for scalability, flexibility, and 
redundancy.  
A. “ALL IP” COMMUNICATIONS 
Recognizing advances in communications technology, the DOD pursued a course 
of research and development to acquire a family of communications equipment that 
would be common among all the U.S. military branches. The project was named the Joint 
Tactical Radio System (JTRS). This acquisition project has largely been deemed an 
abject failure, incurring cost overruns and delays only to produce a final product with 
unacceptable reliability and capability (GAO, 2013, pp. 89–90).  
This document will not seek to analyze the JTRS program, but rather offer 
another way forward to meet the operational requirements of the Marine Corps’ emerging 
CLT and EMO missions, as well as meeting the requirements of a jointly interoperable 
family of systems. Specifically, it should be noted that with the proliferation of software-
defined radios, such as the PRC-117G and PRC-152A, an opportunity exists to move 
tactical communications to an “all IP” framework. By taking advantage of the processing 
power available in mobile radio units, all traffic could be reformatted into standardized IP 
packets. This could then take advantage of an already universal networking language, the 
underlying protocols of the Internet. This IP language is, by its very nature, highly 
interoperable. Combined with systems than can route and forward data such as the 
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MANET radios produced by companies such as TrellisWare and Persistent Systems, a 
true battlefield Internet becomes much more feasible. Voice data would be forwarded in 
much the same way as wire-based VoIP software currently operates, however, the 
experience for the end user would be largely unaffected. This, combined with some 
simple additions such as battlefield servers and routers, could create a truly 
interconnected environment where multiple systems in use by different units and services 
could communicate through shared IP protocols and tactical edge waveforms.  
B. DATA CAPABILITY IN TACTICAL UNITS 
To begin to evaluate the systems best suited for use on the tactical edge of C2, 
one must first have a strong foundation in the system’s requirements, which must be 
grounded in field experimentation and drawn from lessons learned from previous 
conflicts and operations. While there was previously some debate about the need for data 
on the tactical edge, that is to say with squad level units, that debate has largely ended 
within the Marine Corps. Emerging reporting requirements and the added complexity of 
modern conflicts have led the Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad working group to 
determine that the requirements for “real time transfer of data and [communications]” and 
“ability to maintain situational awareness to determine friend or foe” exist on the squad 
level (MERS, 2014).  
C. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
At the time of this document’s writing, the Marine Corps is re-writing its material 
requirements to reflect these changes. However, through field observation and 
experimentation, several key requirements became evident. Between March and June 
2014 I was able to participate in two field experiments and one laboratory experiment 
with IOC and MCWL, respectively. In November 2013, I took an opportunity to deploy 
communications equipment in support of the 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s disaster 
response and humanitarian assistance mission following the wake of destruction left by 
super-typhoon Haiyan (Waddell, 2014). These experiences, combined with personal 
experiences deployed as an infantry officer in the Sangin District of Afghanistan’s 
Helmand province, allow for some contextual critical analysis of some key requirements 
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for Marine Corps expeditionary communication systems. These will be addressed first in 
terms of operational requirements, then in terms of potential material solutions.  
Requirement 1: Scalable and survivable tactical voice communications network. This 
system must be able to operate both in rural, urban, shipboard, and tropical environments. 
This network cannot be dependent on singular nodes as they are vulnerable to targeting 
both with precision weaponry from peer opponents and techniques such as suicide and 
IED bombing from insurgent threats.  
Requirement 2: Simultaneous transfer of voice and data down to the infantry squad level. 
As stated by the MERS working group, the requirement for data exists at the squad level. 
This system must be able to provide this capability without significant additional weight 
and support requirements on the individual warfighters.  
Requirement 3: Long-haul voice/data communications to geographically disbursed units 
and headquarters nodes. This may come in the form of linking offshore headquarters 
elements to a CLT deployed over the horizon or, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, multiple 
units deployed over wide expanses of terrain. As with the local tactical network, this 
system must maintain survivability through decentralization and autonomous self-
forming and self-healing.  
Requirement 4: Interoperability. Modern military operations are, by their very nature, 
jointly executed between multiple services. While the Marine Corps may enjoy the 
benefits of fielding self-contained units, such as the CLT or MEB, at some point they will 
have to interface with their sister services. The communications system employed must 
be interoperable with the joint services as well as maintain options for coalition support.  
Requirement 5: Information availability. The summary goal of this proposed C2 system 
is to provide the warfighters on the tactical edge an opportunity to find utility in 
information. If these edge units have access to the information made available through 
the military intelligence process they will find uses for it in new and inventive ways 
depending on the needs of the individual situation. This information should serve to 
increase situational awareness as well as provide planning tools and intelligence in an on-
demand format, scalable to the needs of the individual warfighter.  
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D. ADVANTAGES OF HIGH THROUGHPUT MANET 
Building on the work conducted by MCWL at RIMPAC 2014, I sought to test the 
higher throughput Persistent Systems MANET in a tactical environment. In June 2014, 
IOC again conducted a field experiment wherein they conducted another two-platoon 
CLT raid using MV-22 Ospreys for insertion. The two platoons were inserted separately 
and simultaneously on opposite sides of a simulated enemy controlled town. Once both 
platoons seized their individual objectives, they consolidated south of the town for a 
resupply drop from a C-130 cargo plane using a containerized delivery system (CDS) 
drop. The two platoons then formed into a movement-to-contact formation and proceeded 
to seek simulated enemy targets as they moved south under cover of night to seize an 
airfield approximately 19 km away (Figure 20).  
 
Figure 20.  Falcon Reach III Scheme of Maneuver 
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Prior to insertion, I had attached two Wave Relay MPU-4 MANET radios to 
instructors shadowing both the student platoons, while attaching one to myself as I 
travelled with one of the platoons. On my body armor I had also fixed a ruggedized flip-
down case carrying a Samsung Galaxy S4 smartphone, which was attached to my MPU-4 
(see Figure 21). The phone itself was loaded both with Wave Relay’s proprietary node 
monitoring and management software as well as the DoD mobile application, Killswitch. 
I positioned myself on the flanks of the movement as we proceeded south. All three 
MPU-4 radios were configured according to the following specifications:  
 Frequency: 2312 Mhz 
 Bandwidth: 20 Mhz 
 Link distance: 1.0 mile 
Due to the tighter combat formation of the Marines as we moved south, my 
radio’s position did not require any hops to complete a link to the two instructor radios. 
However, I was able to record throughput rates between 10 and 20 Mbps. My link 
distances were only between 500–900 meters due to my confined maneuverability on the 
live fire course. However, the data shows that advances in MANET technology allow for 
a local network capacity, which far outpaces the demonstrated ANW2 data rates using 
PRC-117G radios. These data rates are also beyond that observed by MCWL in their 
March 2014 field-testing.  
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Figure 21.  Falcon III Gear Set Provided by NPS 
This high throughput network, combined with the benefits of a self-healing 
MANET architecture, begins to address the requirements stated above. The MANET 
nature of the Wave Relay system provides the survivability and flexibility needed to meet 
Requirement 1. Since the network “self-heals” when nodes are added or lost, it remains 
viable in situations where individual radios may be disabled or destroyed. Additionally, 
each MPU-4 is roughly the same size as the current squad-level radio, the PRC-152A. In 
fact, each fielded MPU-4 was fitted to experiment participants using existing wearable 
cases for the PRC-152A. 
Adding peripheral devices to the network begins to address Requirement 2. The 
smartphone adapter for the MPU-4 allowed me to access the data network provided by 
the Wave Relay MANET. As of firmware version 18.1.6 each Wave Relay radio is able 
to utilize up to 15 push-to-talk (PTT) voice channels per network. The bandwidth 
available on the network is apportioned to allow both application data and VoIP data to 
be transmitted simultaneously. The radios themselves are also usable as wireless access 
points where any 802.11 devices could interface with the MANET (Persistent Systems, 
2014, pp. 52, 67–69).   
Persistent Systems –  
Wave Relay 
MPU‐4 
Fold‐Down Juggernaut Case 
With Smartphone 
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E. LONG-HAUL C2 
Due to the long-range and distributed nature of operations highlighted by the 
requirements of EMO, it is necessary to connect local networks to a second network 
specifically for this purpose. Since units could be several hundred miles away from their 
offshore HHQ nodes, LOS radios cannot be the only gear carried by the CLT. IOC and 
MCWL have both utilized satellite communications in order to bridge this gap. However, 
in the case of IOC, the data rate for the DTCS radios (2.4 kbps) used by their CLT are 
insufficient for media-rich data transfer (pictures and video). MCWL sought to address 
this challenge by utilizing a Ku-band SatCom dish. Their equipment was able to establish 
a link that provided approximately 2 Mbps throughput. While this material solution 
answers the requirement for a higher capacity backhaul method, the form factor of the 
SatCom node, being an entire vehicle, is ill-suited for the rugged terrain and limited 
logistical support infantry Marines can expect to face in scenarios such as those outlined 
in EF21 (USMC, 2014, pp. 9–10).  
While present SatCom technology is unable to provide a man-portable, on-the-
move solution capable of the required data throughput rates, there are some viable 
solutions to the problem. First, the utility of the PTT SatCom radio, in this case the 
DTCS, has already been demonstrated. This system was found to be extremely useful by 
both IOC and MCWL. This relatively simple piece of equipment could keep units 
connected while conducting complex maneuvers where no one unit is static. However, 
once that unit comes to a point where they are able to maintain a static position, for 
example in a platoon patrol base, they could deploy alternate, higher capacity linkages.  
My 2014 ICCRTS paper describes how teams from the NPS’ Hastily Formed 
Networks lab were able to travel around the post-typhoon disaster zone in the Philippines 
(Waddell, 2014). Taking only what equipment that could be carried in backpacks or in 
small transportable cases, each team was able to deploy small aperture Broadband Global 
Access Network (BGAN) systems and maintain connectivity to higher echelon HHQ 
units while being significantly geographically separated. While the throughput was still 
limited (around 200 Kbps), systems like these were capable of maintaining connectivity 
and providing access to applications such as Skype and e-mail. With improvements in 
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small aperture systems steadily entering the market, it is not difficult to conceive of a 
system, which could be acquired from a commercial vendor that could provide a gateway 
for a small unit to its higher headquarters. While this would not provide the throughput of 
an amplified dish on a vehicle, it would provide the connectivity required by front line 
units. Another emerging solution for high-throughput satellite terminals would be 
combining the recently launched O3b constellation with emerging technology in the form 
of flat panel, small-scale tracking-antennas from vendors such as Phasor Solutions 
(Waddell, 2014).  
It is important to note that in my observation of the IOC raid exercises in Talon 
Reach I and II, there was not necessarily a requirement to access data from outside the 
local network at broadband speeds for most of the operation. Rather, the most used 
applications were simple chat windows and locally-stored map imagery with shared 
overlay data. The major drawbacks of their systems only became evident when they 
attempted to pass larger files, such as images of a damage assessment, to HHQ or 
adjacent units. These attempts were largely unsuccessful due to the low throughput on the 
ANW2 network and the lack of over the horizon data systems apart from their DTCS 
radios. The throughput issue is easily solvable using the MANET systems mentioned 
above. However, for broadband outside of the local network, a man-portable small 
aperture terminal such as the BGAN or similar system would prove adequate for the 
necessary task of maintaining a viable data link between higher headquarters and front-
line units.  
It is also important to note that SatCom is not necessarily the only solution for 
long-haul communication. In his NPS thesis, Major Jose Menjivar Captain Mark 
Simmons details how UAVs outfitted with MANET radios could interface with local 
MANETs and act as an aerial relay node (Menjivar, 2012). Using a link such as a UAV 
or a static point-to-point 802.16 antenna or tracking array, a MANET could expand 
beyond the local confines of the transmit power and line of sight limitations to smaller 
maneuver units. This could also serve to provide a means of redundancy should other 
systems such as DTCS or other SatCom assets fail.  
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F. FIELD DATA MANAGEMENT 
As a result of the requirement for the two networks mentioned above, there 
remains the requirement of ensuring these networks are interconnected. That is to say, it 
must be feasible to support a scenario in which a squad of Marines is required to 
broadcast imagery or a document/form from their front line position, through the local 
MANET, and through the over-the-horizon backhaul system. Likewise, it should be 
feasible for an intelligence worker on an offshore amphibious ship to recognize that a 
squad is entering an area known to have a time-sensitive mission tasking on which they 
were not previously briefed, and transmit new orders and associated intelligence products 
to that unit.  
The logical result of multiple battlefield data networks and local node 
management for MANET systems is the inclusion of a robust, field-hardened 
server/router system suitable for a battlefield. MCWL tackled this problem by integrating 
multiple laptop computers with routers on their METN-CE and ME-L vehicles. As 
previously stated, the requirements of CLT missions will not always allow for the 
inclusion of a vehicle asset, at least during the initial phases of an operation. It is 
conceivable, however, that with the advances in mobile computing a system could be 
devised that would allow a CLT unit to accomplish two critical tasks: providing local 
application data storage and support, as well as acting as the network manager for the 
CLT. Standard practice already includes carrying larger radio systems, such as the 
original PRC-117—roughly twice the size of the “G” version, which is more than enough 
“tactical real estate” to substitute with a man portable system that would accomplish the 
above requirements. 
The primary function of this system would be to conduct network management. 
That is to say, it must first control gateway access outside the local MANET, as well as 
manage the traffic in and out of potentially multiple gateways (i.e., aerial relay and/or 
SatCom methods). Due to the throughput limitations of systems such as the BGAN, it is 
infeasible with present technology to allow every node on the MANET to access that data 
source. Instead, only specific application data such as PLI and simple overlay data for 
mapping and COP applications would be permitted, with larger files only passing through 
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on a mission-critical need basis. Instead, all other data requirements would be handled 
locally on its internal hard drives. This would allow the MANET users to take full 
advantage of the high throughput speeds of the local links to support faster data transfer 
and more bandwidth intensive applications such as video streaming without 
overwhelming the lower throughput of the over-the-horizon links. Higher volume data 
that is often static, such as high-resolution map imagery, media intensive intelligence 
reports, as well as data for the applications in use by lower-level peripheral devices, such 
as smartphones and tablets, could be stored on local drives and updated between 
missions. Should HHQ deem certain additional larger files necessary to mission success, 
these drives could be updated via their network management software, which would 
allocate all available throughput to the higher priority data. An additional function this 
system could provide is to make radio-over-IP (ROIP) possible between geographically 
dispersed units. At present, Persistent Systems has a software solution for cloud-based 
PTT radio, making ROIP accessible by any user with Internet or intranet access. This 
would alleviate the reliance on DTCS radios for over-the-horizon voice communications. 
These processes and others would largely run “in the background” with local users 
provided on-demand access to an information rich environment. A system like this would 
begin to address Requirement 5.  
G. APPLICATION LAYER 
A productive end user experience is the ultimate goal of this network. In order for 
a new system like this to be adopted it must both provide the same or better level of 
service as the systems currently in place as well as provide a significant advantage over 
those systems in terms of added capability. While software design is best suited to 
follow-on research, some observations from the IOC and MCWL experiments as well as 
reports from recently deployed combat units may prove relevant in perceiving the 
potential application layer of this system. 
The first focus of this group of applications must be the COP software. This was, 
by far, the most used feature in the observed field experiments. For the IOC team, the 
DoD-developed software, Killswitch, was the primary tool. This software is a touch-
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screen based application that provided the user with map imagery as well as planning 
tools, which could be collaboratively distributed among the network’s users. I more often 
observed IOC students using their assigned tablets to conduct rapid “map-checks” where 
they were able to reference both traditional maps as well as aerial imagery of their 
surroundings and targets. Admittedly their allocated training time on the new software 
was limited, so use of higher order functionality was minimal. However, the ability to 
share route planning and other tools known as tactical control measures (TCMs) was 
extremely exciting to both the students and the more seasoned staff of combat 
experienced instructors.  
The second tool that must be provided to front-line units is access to a file transfer 
system and shared database. Recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have noted the 
need for a shared information environment. In 2007–2008, Marine Regimental Combat 
Team (RCT) 2 noted a significant shortfall in the manner in which data was transferred 
between units. RCT-2 notes that information management was largely conducted by 
exchanging an actual external hard drive between units because the servers were not 
populated with the most relevant information to their current operations (RCT-2, 2008). 
More recently, in 2010 in Afghanistan, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion noted the 
importance of shared chat windows that allowed proactive coordination between 
geographically separated entities (1st Recon, 2010). This unit also noted the drastic 
increases in situation awareness provided to distributed units through the simple addition 
of the PRC-117G and its ability to connect units via ToughBook laptops to their HHQ 
(1st Recon, 2010). Another major unit in Afghanistan, the 7th Marine Regiment, noted in 
2011 that there were issues with how local census data and biometrics were dispersed. 
They cited issues with their ability to populate a database with information gathered in 
the field, such as iris scans and fingerprints of individuals encountered by patrols. They 
recommended finding a way to more efficiently populate a shared database (7th Marine 
Regiment 2011). Other interviews with lower-level officers regarding their time in OEF 
cited inadequate automated COP assets and instances in which the best situational 
awareness tool was the nightly radio conference between company level staff, resulting in 
a decidedly analog shared information environment (MCCLL, 2011). These use cases, 
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combined with the imperatives highlighted by IOC and MCWL for the creation of a 
system that supports a shared information environment, make a compelling case for the 
fielding of peripheral devices capable of providing a COP as well as access to a common 
database.  
H. ARCHITECTURE 
The systems described above would force the Marine Corps to adopt a new 
communications architecture. However, this architecture would result in mostly 
transparent changes to the equipment footprint of the individual Marine. Squads would 
still be carrying a radio that would largely resemble what they have been previously 
using, the PRC-152. Their only addition would be a smartphone or similar peripheral 
device. Platoon leadership would only see the addition of DTCS radios, and the possible 
addition of a SatCom gateway device such as a BGAN, in place of their PRC-117. 
Company leadership would see the addition of DTCS radios, their gateway device, and 
the battlefield server system described above. The resultant architecture is depicted in 
Figure 22.  
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Figure 22.  Proposed Architecture 
This architecture is designed to provide survivability through diverse information 
paths. Each unit depicted has multiple methods for maintaining contact with their 
adjacent and supporting units. In the case of the support element, should they lose their 
SatCom gateway link, they have the option of terrestrial relay, aerial relay, or simple 
DTCS communications. This system also does not impose additional logistical burden on 
the deployed unit. There are no vehicles to refuel or larger power sources necessary to 
maintain this network.  
As this chapter illustrates, the technology required to greatly increase operational 
capacity and capability is largely mature. Incremental action could be taken while still 
enjoying the benefits of the final proposed system, above. MANET radios, already being 
field tested by MCWL with fleet units, could be fielded as an alternative to the delinquent 
and deficient JTRS man-portable systems. Integration of these MANET systems could be 
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accomplished while the Marine Corps makes a material decision on what its COP 
mobile-application will officially be and what commercial SatCom services will be 
acquired for long-range data connectivity. Further research into the hardening of field 
servers and addition of battlefield application-layer service would need further 
development. This development, however, could be integrated quickly if the Marine 
Corps takes steps to upgrade their battlefield network infrastructure in the near-term, 



























V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY FINDINGS 
The principal hypothesis underlying this research was determined to be correct. 
At the currently level of technological maturity it is absolutely possible to support a data-
rich environment on the tactical edge of Marine Corps units while operating under the 
austere conditions outlined in EF21 and the Vision & Strategy 2025 document. By using 
Persistent Systems MPU-4 radios I was able to achieve data throughput rates of up to  
20 Mbps across an infantry formation while conducting an attack. While in the 
Philippines, I observed the utility of portable, small aperture SatCom data terminals. 
Combined with intelligent, forward-deployed network control nodes and redundant push-
to-talk SatCom systems like DTCS and MUOS, it is possible to create a highly survivable 
system of systems while also maintaining an expeditionary logistical footprint. This 
network is the enabler for putting smart devices in the hands of talented combat leaders 
on the tactical edge to enable a much more robust and responsive information 
environment than is currently available to today’s warfighter.  
It is worth noting that equipment like this has already been deployed in real world 
situations. In response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake the team from the NPS HFN Lab was 
able to use BGAN networks and wireless mesh networks to enable communication where 
no infrastructure currently existed (Nelson, Stamberger, & Steckler, 2011, p. 468). In the 
wake of Hurricane Sandy the New York City, the U.S. Coast Guard was able to rapidly 
deploy Wave Relay radios to enable communications throughput at around 65% of what 
they had available with fixed infrastructure that had had been damaged in the disaster 
(Robinson, 2013). This should be encouraging to military acquisition professionals in that 
many of the risks associated with technology development have been mitigated through 
years of successful deployments of these technologies within the civilian sector.  
B. POTENTIAL FURTHER RESEARCH 
Before the architecture advocated for in this document can be formally fielded, 
there must be additional research into a couple key areas to make this solution set feasible 
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for military use. First, research and development must be allocated to hardening the 
cybersecurity of this system. While each device mentioned in this document is capable of 
some form of encryption, it is incumbent upon acquisitions professionals to work with 
COTS and GOTS vendors to ensure devices meet the cryptological security needs of the 
modern cyber battlefield. There is an inherent vulnerability by creating an IP-based 
communications system that reaches between the lowest and most physically exposed 
locations on the battlefield and off-site headquarters servers. Additional research in 
trusted handheld computing technology and risk mitigation must be pursued.  
Additionally, further research is needed in the development and acquisition of 
battlefield hardened network control nodes, such as those suggested in Chapter IV of this 
document. As computing power moves toward the tactical edge, the responsibility for 
node control will also move forward into the field. This is as much a hardware issue as it 
is a training issue. Our enlisted communications specialists must now also be trained on 
basic IP principals as well as radio wave propagation. Hardware and software 
acquisitions for this battlefield server and network management system must take 
advantage of advances in intuitive application interfaces that mirror the systems our 
Marines would use on a daily basis in the civilian world. Every effort must be made to 
introduce this piece of gear as not burdensome but as a useful addition to their equipment 
set. Research should also take place to determine the requirements on gateway control 
that will drive acquisition of satellite terminals as well as application layer data usage. It 
is important that these requirements be taken from field observation in realistic 
environments and use cases as was done in this document. From my observations,  
the most useful tools for individual tactical leaders were simple text messaging and  
chat programs as well as PLI and overlay sharing of COP programs with pre-loaded map 
data. Until our over-the-horizon communications equipment advances, acquisitions 
professionals should be wary of imposing additional requirements, such as full motion 
video streaming, from field units to HHQ. Local streaming can be done through MANET 
links to UAVs, but additional streams through SatCom assets have the potential to be 
burdensome on both the system’s architecture as well as the individual Marine.  
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Another area of study to help drive requirements for further application layer 
acquisitions should be a measure of the utility of information to tactical leaders. There is 
a potential for information overload on the individual tactical decision maker. I observed 
this in the field experiments with IOC. Often, at the onset of a mission, leaders felt the 
need to always be plugged into their device, rather than directing their subordinate units 
and carrying out their primary mission. Behavioral research should be conducted to 
measure what the warfighter’s informational dashboard should contain and which 
applications are assets and which applications have the potential to overwhelm him. 
Principal to this research should be a way in which to impose a system of checks and 
balances for higher-level leaders to avoid informational micromanagement. An example 
of this is in the full motion video argument posited above. While there may be use cases 
where decision makers must stream video to and from their HHQ or to subject matter 
experts, it may be unwieldy for tactical leaders to be forced to have a video feed to a 
higher-level officer to validate their decision-making in real time. Striking the balance of 
information utility and information overload must drive the requirements of both the 
system architecture as well as the doctrine and use cases of the new C2 system.  
C. CONCLUSION 
My research can confidently support my original hypothesis in that these 
capabilities are within the realm of the possible at the currently available levels of 
technological maturity. The pinnacle point I wish to convey is not the feasibility but the 
urgency of C2 modernization. At the time of this document’s writing, permanently 
stationed Special Purpose MAGTFs are being positioned in Europe, the Persian Gulf and 
Southeast Asia. These units have been designated as primarily responsible for crisis 
response forces, largely growing out of the vulnerabilities demonstrated in the 2012 
attack on the American Consulate in Benghazi, Libya. These units, along with the 
existing expeditionary presence of multiple forward-deployed MEUs around the world, 
are requiring Marines to return to their expeditionary roots rather than conducting steady 
state operations within established infrastructure as was done in the wars in Iraq and 
later-stage Afghanistan.  
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It is imperative that the Marine Corps, with its unique deployment challenges and 
mission sets, adopt an aggressive acquisitions strategy to modernize its expeditionary C2 
capabilities. The functional requirements for data availability at the tactical edge will 
likely continue to grow, and the Marines must take steps to adopt a system of systems, 
which provides the services necessary for tactical and operational success while allowing 
for an upgradable and expandable architecture as technology continues to rapidly 
improve. Failing this, we may soon see our Marines, with the world’s largest defense 
budget behind them, outpaced and outmaneuvered in the information environment of 
modern combat by small teams with smartphones, as IOC discovered in 2013 (IOC, 
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